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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey' of commercial law attempts to cover all of the
Florida cases and legislation encompassed by the umbrella of the
Uniform Commercial Code. In addition, federal and Florida con-
sumer oriented legislation and administrative regulations will be
dealt with along with some real property cases which can be fitted
by analogy under sale of goods concepts. Attention will also be
devoted to garnishment, mortgages, suretyship and aspects of
banking not found within articles 3 and 4 of the UCC.
The number of products liability cases has seemed to spiral in
the last few years, and a surprising number of security interest cases
reached the appellate courts which demonstrated a low level of so-
phistication (if not total ignorance) in dealing with article 9 of the
UCC.
II. SALE OF GOODS
A. Use of Article Two by Analogy
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that a complicated
stock purchase agreement which provided that the consideration
was to be based upon a "cash flow benefit" was not so vague as to
be incapable of being specifically enforced. The court cited as anal-
ogy for its holding section 2-204 of the UCC, which provides that
''even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does
not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a
contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appro-
priate remedy."'
B. Statute of Frauds
When the plaintiff-subcontractor alleges in his complaint that
he had a contract with the defendant-contractor to install carpeting
in houses (owned by a third party), with the plaintiff supplying the
labor, padding and metal strips, and with the defendant contractor
1. This survey covers the cases reported in volumes 274 So. 2d through 315 So. 2d, and
the legislation enacted by the 1974 and 1975 legislatures.
2. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Data Lease Financial Corp., 302 So. 2d 404
(Fla. 1974).
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supplying the carpeting, this contract may be deemed one for serv-
ices rather than for the sale of goods; thus it would not come within
the statute of frauds provision of the UCC.1
C. Notice of Breach
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has held that
when a merchant sues on an account stated for goods sold, the
defendant customer who has failed to complain about the quality
of the goods until the suit is filed four years after the sale has, by
his conduct, waived his right of action for damages as alleged in his
counterclaim.' The court failed to cite section 2-607(3) of the UCC,
which states that when a tender has been accepted the buyer must
within a reasonable time after he discovers any breach notify the
seller or be barred from any remedy.
D. Unconscionability
A purchase money installment sales contract for a mobile home
which provides for interest at the rate of 11.75% per annum is not
unconscionable for this reason alone under section 2-302 of the UCC,
and the contract is enforceable. It is interesting to note that this
issue of unconscionability was raised by the trial court rather than
by the parties, and, in the process, the court failed to rule on other
issues raised by the buyers of the mobile home.
E. Fraudulent Sales
A seller who knowingly sells stolen property may be held liable
for breach of warranty of title and for fraud and misrepresentation,
and punitive damages may be awarded.6
In a similar vein, a car dealer may be held liable for punitive
damages based upon the fraudulent and deceitful sale of a car with
a false odometer reading.'
F. Products Liability Cases
If the undisputed facts show that a defendant foreign manu-
facturer sold fittings to a Florida corporation which in turn sold
3. Dionne v. Columbus Mills, Inc., 311 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
4. Rylander v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 302 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
5. Mobile America Corp. v. Howard, 307 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
6. Lloyd v. DeFerrari, 314 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
7. Roger Holler Chevrolet Co. v. Arvey, 314 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
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them to the plaintiff, that the foreign manufacturer sold at least
$13,000 worth of these fittings to three Florida suppliers for each of
the last five years, and that the president of the foreign manufac-
turer met with the plaintiff concerning the replacement of these
fittings, then the foreign manufacturer was doing business in Flor-
ida under sections 48.181 and 48.193 of the Florida Statutes and was
subject to process under these sections.'
Section 2-725(2) of the UCC provides that the cause of action
accrues when the breach occurs and that the breach of warranty
occurs when tender of delivery is made. The District Court of Ap-
peal, Second District, has cited this section as one of its authorities
for the proposition that the proper venue for the sale of a horse was
in the county in which the sellers delivered the horse to the buyers
rather than in another county in which the contract of sale (which
contained the warranties covering the horse) was entered into.'
When a jury finds that the operator of a lawn mower was guilty
of negligent use of the machine which resulted in a rock being
thrown into the plaintiff's eye, the mower's owner (who is vicari-
ously liable for the acts of his son who was operating it) may not
secure indemnification from the manufacturer of the lawn mower on
the basis of negligent design and breach of warranty.'"
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has seemed to
indicate that a customer of a self-service laundromat would have a
cause of action against the laundromat for breach of an implied
warranty when her arm was torn off as a result of a premature
starting of a washing machine when she was loading a rug into it.",
As authority for its holding, the court cited the case of W E. John-
son Equipment Co. v. United Airlines, which held that there may
be an implied warranty of fitness when a lessor leases a chattel
knowing the particular purpose for which the chattel is leased.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has held in a case
of first impression in Florida that an automobile manufacturer may
be held liable both in negligence and for breach of an implied war-
ranty for a defect in the manufacturing of the interior of a car which
causes injury to a passenger when the car is struck by another vehi-
cle. Under this "secondary-impact" holding the manufacturer is
under a duty to design and manufacture the vehicle in such a way
8. Dublin Co. v. Peninsular Supply Co. 309 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
9. Stanfield v. DeStefano, 300 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
10. Dura Corp. v. Wallace, 297 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
11. Washwell, Inc. v. Morejon, 294 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
12. 238 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1970).
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as to avoid subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk of injury in
the event of a collision. In the instant case, the passenger in the rear
of the car was propelled forward into the front seat, which slid
forward in the seat track, allowing the passenger's head to strike the
sharp track and causing fatal injuries."
In a breach of warranty case it is not necessary to prove a
specific defect in the goods which caused injury to the user; a defect
can be inferred from the fact that the product failed in a certain
manner. For example, when a plaintiff user of a relatively new alu-
minum ladder (which was supplied by his employer) suffered a fall
as the result of a sudden break in a "rear upright" of the ladder, he
may be able to recover in a suit against the manufacturer of the
ladder even though the ladder has disappeared and the user is un-
able to delineate specifically the particular defect in it. 4 In a similar
vein, when a workman was killed because of the failure of an eleva-
tor locking device, which allowed the elevator upon which the de-
ceased was standing to fall, his widow "was not under any duty to
pin-point any exact mechanical deficiency for or by reason of which
the device proved defective and failed.""
In a giant step backwards, the District Court of Appeal, First
District, apparently has held that when a consumer is injured in her
home as the result of an exploding soft-drink bottle purchased from
a retailer, she may not recover either in negligence or in implied
warranty against the bottling company unless she is able to prove
how the bottle was handled from the moment it left the bottling
plant until the moment of explosion. The plaintiff consumer may
not rely upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor unless she is able to
prove the foregoing facts. The dissenting judge was of the view that
if a possible mishandling of the bottle by the retailer was the de-
fense, this issue could be developed between the bottler and the
retailer since both parties were joined as defendants. The dissenting
judge also suggested that the obvious result of the majority holding
would be to deprive virtually all injured consumers in exploding
bottle cases from relief against the bottlers."
The privity notion in implied warranty cases was given an
unusual twist in Mattes v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Miami.7 A lady
13. Evancho v. Thiel, 297 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1974).
14. McCarthy v. Florida Ladder Co., 295 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
15. Armor Elevator Co. v. Wood, 312 So. 2d 514, 515 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
16. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Clark, 299 So. 2d 78 (Fla. lst Dist.), cert. dismissed, 301
So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1974).
17. 311 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
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shopper picked up a carton of Coca Cola from a stack of Coca Cola
in a grocery store. She turned around, walked five or six steps and
then she heard a "bang" followed by the sounds of bottles falling
and breaking. She felt pain in both legs which were bleeding. The
woman was unable to testify that any of the Coca Cola bottles were
defective; the carton of bottles in her hand did not explode. The trial
court dismissed the implied warranty claim, and the appellate court
affirmed on the ground that the plaintiff was a bystander, not a
purchaser or user, and that she failed to show that the bottle was a
dangerous instrumentality sufficient to overcome the privity
requirement in warranty. The excellent dissenting opinion of Judge
Mager advocates the view that privity is no longer a requisite under
Florida law and that strict liability in tort under section 402A of the
Restatement of Torts (Second) ("Restatement 402A") should be the
proper remedy in product liability cases.
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has stated that
prior Florida cases have reached the view that "negligent construc-
tion or design of an article which is not a dangerous instrumentality
per se can subject the manufacturer to liability if a user sustains an
injury as a result of an inherently dangerous condition in an other-
wise innocent looking instrumentality."' 8 The court then said that
this same rule should be extended to sellers of goods which may be
dangerous instrumentalities as a result of improper construction or
design in light of Restatement 402A, and the court applied the rule
to a case where a minor guest was seriously burned as a result of an
explosion allegedly caused by the improper construction or design
of a patio Hawaiian torch purchased by his hosts. On the other
hand, the District Court of Appeal, First District, has again rejected
the doctrine of strict liability in product liability cases, and ex-
pressly refused to follow the Fourth District's view, which was la-
beled as dicta. 9
The Florida law of products liability was further muddled in
Favors v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.20 Sunrise, the purchaser of a
new Ford truck, took it to a Goodyear store to have the tires
changed. Plaintiffs, employees of the Goodyear store, did the tire
changing; shortly afterwards one of the rims pulled apart, exploded
and came off the wheel, seriously injuring the employee tire chan-
18. Keller v. Eagle Army-Navy Dep't Stores, Inc., 291 So. 2d 58, 60 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974)
(court's emphasis).
19. Linder v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 315 So 2d 199 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975), following
Lipsius v. Bristol-Myers Co., 265 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
20. 309 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
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gers. The employees sued Ford and the Firestone Company, which
had manufactured the wheel assembly sold to Ford and incorpo-
rated into the truck, on the theories of implied warranty, negligence
and strict liability in tort. They also sued Sunrise for breach of an
implied warranty. The appellate court held: (1) Ford, which assem-
bled a part produced by another manufacturer, is deemed as the
manufacturer of the part under prior case law which has not been
superseded by the Code; "the implied warranty doctrine developed
in Florida prior to adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code is still
viable."' ' (2) Firestone would also be liable under a warranty theory.
(3) The allegations of the complaint relating to improper design and
manufacture by Ford and Firestone "set forth a sufficient claim for
relief for breach of implied warranty within the rule contained in the
Restatement of Torts which has been approved in Florida."2 The
court cited section 398 of the Restatement of Torts (Second) without
realizing that this section has nothing to do with an "implied war-
ranty." (4) The theory of strict liability should be rejected "inas-
much as it has not been recognized in Florida." 3 The court conven-
iently forgot its own prior case of Keller v. Eagle Army-Navy De-
partment Stores,24 which applied Restatement 402A against a re-
tailer. The dissent brought this case to the attention of the court.
(5) The implied warranties created by section 2-314 of the UCC
would not run to the employees of the Goodyear store because there
was no privity between them and the manufacturer of the truck and
wheel. (6) Sunrise, as owner-bailor of the truck, would not be liable
for warranties under section 2-314 since it was not a seller and there
is no reason to extend warranties to this type of bailment. Insofar
as the fifth holding of the court is concerned, there is no reason for
a court to restrict section 2-314 warranties to persons in privity with
the seller inasmuch as a comment to section 2-318 (which was cited
by the court) virtually encourages courts to extend the reach of
warranties.
When a complaint alleges the negligent furnishing of service by
a telephone company in installing telephone equipment (the negli-
gent failure to ground the telephone line allegedly resulted in a
lightning strike causing the destruction by fire of the customer's
office) as distinguished from a sale or bailment of a product, no
21. Id. at 71.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 72.
24. 291 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974). See text accompanying note 18 supra.
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warranty of fitness is implied.25
When an expert testifies that the aluminum in an eight-foot
ladder manufactured by one defendant and sold by another was of
an improper thickness, and his testimony is based upon plans and
specifications for a fourteen-foot ladder which were furnished by the
defendants and the defendants fail to raise this mistake at the trial,
they cannot raise it on appeal. In addition, since the defendants'
negligence in part caused this incorrect testimony, they cannot raise
this error.2"
If all the evidence shows that an exploding tire rather than any
defect in a tire-changing machine caused the plaintiff's injuries, the
court may direct a verdict in favor of the manufacturer of the ma-
chine.27
When a suit for breach of warranty and negligence for the death
of a driver is based upon loss of control of the car resulting from a
broken adjustor nut located on the top of the steering gear box, and
it is a matter of conjecture as to whether the nut broke as a result
of the car leaving the road or as a result of a great force being exerted
against it on a prior occasion, it is proper for the trial court to set
aside the jury verdict and to enter a judgment for the manufac-
turer.2"
Section 672.316(5) of the Florida Statutes provides that the
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular
purpose shall not be applicable against the supplier of whole blood,
plasma, blood products and blood derivatives "as to a defect that
cannot be detected or removed by reasonable use of scientific proce-
dures or techniques." The statute has been interpreted to mean that
if a plaintiff is able to show that serum hepatitis is detectable or
removable by the use of reasonable scientific procedures or tech-
niques, he may maintain an action for damages against the hospital
and physicians who sold and administered blood based upon a hy-
brid implied warranty of fitness "which departs from the concept
of strict liability or liability without fault ordinarily ascribed to such
warranty and instead establishes a criteria for recovery which is
ordinarily understood by lawyers and judges to be cognizable in
negligence."29
25. Lauck v. General Tel. Co., 300 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
26. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. McAfoos, 303 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
27. Simpson v. Coats Co., 306 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
28. Cromarty v. Ford Motor Co., 308 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
29. Williamson v. Memorial Hosp., 307 So. 2d 199, 201 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
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The relationship of products liability and medical practice was
further developed in E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Stickney, 0 in
which Boplant (a calf-bone product) was used as a grafting material
for a spinal operation. Three years after the operation the patient
again underwent surgery, the Boplant having failed to unite with
the vertebrae. The graft failed because the Boplant had been re-
jected by the antigen-antibody response of the patient to the mate-
rial. The Boplant was removed and a suit was filed against the
manufacturer based upon negligence, breach of express and implied
warranties and fraud. The trial court held for the patient, while the
appellate court held (in a well analyzed opinion) that regardless of
the theory of the suit (whether negligence or warranty), a defect in
the product would have to be shown. The court noted that in most
product liability cases the plaintiff is able to show some foreign
substance in the goods, while in this instance the plaintiff based his
case on the proposition that all Boplant was inherently defective at
the moment of its production and packaging because the residual
antigens present in the implant rendered it useless for bone grafting
purposes and unfit for use in surgical operations on human beings.
The court noted that Boplant had been successful in 85 to 90 percent
of the reported operations in the United States. The medical profes-
sion knew that there were residual antigens which Squibb was un-
able to extract and which, when implanted in some patients, set in
motion an antibody rejection process which resulted in a surgical
failure. This 10 to 15 percent failure rate did not render the Boplant
inherently unfit or defective in light of the high percentage of suc-
cess realized in thousands of other operations.
A buyer who sues a seller of commercial laundry equipment for
delay in shipping the equipment and for defects in the delivered
equipment is not entitled to recover for loss of accounts, loss of
profits and ensuing bankruptcy of the laundry business unless these
items of damage were claimed in the complaint. In the absence of
these specific allegations, recovery would be limited to losses such
as those dealing with the use or rental value of the equipment during
the period of delay. The decision seems to indicate that the court
was completely unaware that the transaction was governed by the
UCC.3'
In a suit for damages by the buyer claiming that the seller of a
30. 274 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1st Dist.), cert. denied, 285 So. 2d 414, (Fla. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 961 (1974).
31. Baring Indus., Inc. v. Rayglo, Inc., 303 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1974).
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computer failed to program it properly, it is proper for the trial court
to instruct the jury that the amount of damages should be "the
difference in the value of the computer as it was programmed, and
its value if it had been programmed in accordance with the terms
of the contract,"" even though the jury awarded $20,000 when the
contract price was only $18,240.58.
A mother who brings suit for breach of warranty and negli-
gence, claiming that a drug manufactured by the defendant and
consumed by the plaintiff during her pregnancy under directions of
an obstetrician caused physical anomolies to her minor child, will
not be able to recover for mental pain and suffering in the absence
of any "impact" between the drug and the mother and child.3 If the
impact rule is designed to cull-out spurious claims, then it should
have no application in a case involving obvious physical harm
caused by a drug.
A houseboat owner who is advised by the president of the mar-
ine division of an engine manufacturer to purchase and install cer-
tain engines and outdrives and does so in reliance upon this advice
is the recipient of an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit
for the particular purpose for which they are required under section
2-315 of the UCC.11 These facts would also give rise to an express
warranty under section 2-313 of the UCC, but this issue was not
discussed by the court.
A shopping center which purchases fireworks from the manu-
facturer and employs a person to put on a fireworks display is not
liable to this employee for breach of an implied warranty when one
of the rockets prematurely explodes and injures him, since there was
no sale between the employee and the shopping center. The em-
ployee recovered (in a companion law suit) against the manufac-
turer under the theory of negligence and res ipsa loquitor.3 5
In an apparent case of first impression in Florida, the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has held that an amusement park
ride is not to be equated with a common carrier and, therefore, a
passenger who was injured on the ride could not base a suit for
breach of an implied warranty of carriage against the operator of the
ride .31
32. Burroughs Corp. v. Joseph Uram Jewelers, Inc., 305 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
33. Pazo v. Upjohn Co., 310 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
34. Chrysler Corp. v. Miller, 310 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
35. Marini v. Town & Country Plaza Merchants Ass'n, 314 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1975) and Vitale Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Marini, 314 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
36. Sergermeister v. Recreation Corp. of America, 314 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
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G. Disclaimer of Warranties
In an apparent case of second impression in the United States,
the District Court of Appeal, Second District, has held that al-
though section 2-316(3)(a) of the UCC does not specifically state
that an "as is" or "with all faults" disclaimer of implied warranties
of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose must be in
"conspicuous" print (as does section 2-316(2)), the requirement of
conspicuousness is to be read into the sub-section. An "as is" dis-
claimer which is not conspicuous will be deemed ineffective.37
H. Real Property and Warranty of Quality
The District Court of Appeal, First District, has held, rather
casually, that a swimming pool contractor who contracts to build a
pool gives an implied warranty of merchantability; no authority was
cited for this proposition of law.3"
In a suit brought against the developer of a condominium for
breach of warranty, a condominium association does not have
standing to sue in a representative capacity on behalf of the original
owners and purchasers of units. Although this particular case in-
volved real property, the rule would seem analagous in sale of goods
cases.
3 9
An air conditioning system which is permanently installed in a
hotel bears an implied warranty of fitness and merchantability even
when it is sold with a warranty which expressly limits "the guaran-
tee to one year. 40
I. Revocation of Acceptance
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has held that
when a buyer of a car brings a suit against the seller for damages,
cancellation, rescission and declaratory relief based upon breach of
implied and express warranties, these claims were mutually exclu-
sive because a claim for rescission is predicated on disavowal of the
contract while a claim for damages is based upon its affirmance. As
a result, the court upheld the order of a trial court which suspended
action on the suit until the plaintiff elected to proceed either with
the rescission claim or the damage claim. It is discouraging to note
37. Osborne v. Genevie, 289 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
38. Tropicana Pools, Inc. v. Boysen, 296 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
39. Rubenstein v. Burleigh House, Inc., 305 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
40. Forte Towers S., Inc. v. Hill York Sales Corp., 312 So. 2d 513, 514 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
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that the court seemed to be completely unaware of sections 2-608
(and its accompanying comment 1), 2-711(1) and (3), 2-714, 2-715
and 2-719 of the UCC, all of which reject any notion of election of
remedies. For that matter, the court seemed unaware of any law on
this point since it cited no authority."
Revocation of acceptance under section 2-608 of the UCC has
been judicially sanctioned in a case in which the buyer claimed
that carpeting installed by a department store seller was wet when
it was installed and the seam had split.2
J. Sales of Beer and Wine
Section 562.21 of the Florida Statutes provides that all whole-
sale sales of beer and wine to retailers must be for cash; the statutes
do not impose a similar requirement in the sale of hard liquor to
retailers, nor do the statutes impose a similar requirement for sales
between brewers and their distributors. The Supreme Court of Flor-
ida invalidated this section as an "invidious discrimination" against
retail beer and wine vendors and an unconstitutional denial of equal
protection.4" In further proceedings, the Court has said (in a very
confusing opinion) that since sales of hard liquor may be made to
retail vendors on ten days credit according to a statute, retail beer
and wine vendors are also entitled to ten days credit in their pur-
chases from suppliers."
K. Legislation
Chapter 95 of the Florida Statutes, which governs the time
limitations for bringing suit, has been extensively amended, and
section 2-725 of the UCC (Florida Statutes section 672.725) has been
repealed.45 Former section 672.725 provided:
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be com-
menced within four years after the cause of action has accrued.
By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of
limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless
of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach
41. Deemer v. Hallet Pontiac, Inc., 288 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
42. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Planes, 305 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
43. Castlewood Int'l Corp. v. Wynne, 294 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1974).
44. Castlewood Int'l Corp. v. Wynne, 305 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 1974), noted in 29 U. MIAMI
L. Ray. 785 (1975).
45. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-382.
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of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that
where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the
goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such
performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or
should have been discovered.
Section 95.03 as amended provides that "[a]ny provision in a
contract fixing the period of time within which an action arising out
of the contract may be begun at a time less than that provided by
the applicable statute of limitations is void." Amended section
95.11(3)(1) now provides that an action for the sale and delivery of
goods, wares and merchandise must be brought within four years,
and this is, of course, consistent with section 2-725 of the UCC.
Section 95.11(3)(f) also provides that "an action for injury to a
person founded on the design, manufacture, distribution or sale of
personal property that is not permanently incorporated in an im-
provement to real property, including fixtures" must be brought
within four years. Again, this is consistent with the UCC. However,
section 95.031(2) now provides that
[a]ctions for products liability . . . under subsection (3) of s.
95.11 must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter,
with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the
cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered
with the exercise of due diligence, instead of running from any
date prescribed elsewhere in subsection (3) of s. 95.11, but in any
event within 12 years after the date of delivery of the completed
product to its original purchaser . . . , regardless of the date the
defect in the product . . . was or should have been discovered.
Under the UCC the cause of action normally accrues when the
goods are delivered, while under section 95.031(2) the cause of ac-
tion accrues when the defect was discovered or should have been
discovered, and this might extend to almost 12 years.
In a more constructive vein, section 95.11(5) now provides that
suits brought for violations of the bulk sales provisions of the UCC
must be brought within one year.
A Mobile Home and Recreational Vehicle Manufacturer Act
was passed in 1974 to provide, in extensive detail, for the licensing
and controlling of mobile home manufacturers.46 The act further
requires that mobile home manufacturers and dealers give warran-
ties of quality as delineated in the act. These warranties are addi-
tional to any other remedies offered by the UCC; however, this
46. FLA. STAT. §§ 320.85-.864 (Supp. 1974).
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mobile home act forbids the manufacturer and dealers from requir-
ing the buyer "to waive his rights under this act or any other rights
under law. Any such waiver shall be deemed contrary to public
policy and shall be unenforceable and void."47
It is interesting to compare these "mobile home warranties"
with the "warranties of fitness and merchantability" provided for
in the new Condominiums and Cooperative Apartments Act.48 The
condominium warranties have a life span of either one year, three
years or five years depending upon the nature of these warranties
of "fitness and merchantability," while the mobile home act goes
into detail as to defects, nature of the component parts of a mobile
home, etc.
The Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act49 was enacted in
1973 to protect consumers from suppliers who commit deceptive and
unfair trade practices; nevertheless, the draftsmen were apparently
unable to define this term since the Act states that in order to
construe this term "great weight shall be given to the interpreta-
tions of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts
relating to § 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act . . . , as
from time to time amended."5 0 The Act further authorized the Flor-
ida Department of Legal Affairs to propose rules to the Florida
cabinet for adoption by that body. These rules must be consistent
with "the rules, regulations and decisions of the Federal Trade
Commission and the federal courts in interpreting the provisions
of § 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act . . .as from
time to time amended."'" In any event, the Florida cabinet
adopted:" extensive rules which are designed to forbid "bait and
switch" advertising and activities and foreign language tricks in
sales; rules governing the labeling of the cooling and heating capac-
ity of air conditioners; regulations of home improvement contracts,
future consumer services (such as reducing studios, dance studios,
etc.); and regulations governing motor vehicle sales and services,
etc.
47. Fi.A. STAT. § 320.839 (Supp. 1974).
48. FLA. STAT. § 711.65 (Supp. 1974).
49. F.A. STAT. §§ 501.202-.213 (1973).
50. Fi.A. STAT. § 501.204(2) (1973).
51. Id.
52. FtA. ADMIN. CODE chs. 2-7 to 2-20 (1975).
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Florida's Fair Trade Law has been repealed effective October
1, 1975. 5
Congress has enacted a Consumer Product Warranty Act54
which is applicable to the sale of consumer goods (valued in excess
of $5.00 in some cases and $10.00 in others) in interstate commerce.
The act requires that any written warranty be in simple language
and labeled clearly and conspiciously as a full or limited warranty.
A full warranty requires the warrantor to remedy any defect within
a reasonable time and without charge, and forbids the warrantor to
exclude or limit consequential damages for breach of any written or
implied warranty unless such exclusion or limitation conspicuously
appears on the face of the warranty; the warrantor must permit the
consumer a refund or replacement without charge if a defect cannot
be remedied. The Federal Trade Commission is given the authority
to articulate rules which may require inclusion in the written war-
ranty of any of the following items (among others): (1) clear identifi-
cation of the names and addresses of the warrantors; (2) identity of
the persons to whom the warranty is extended; (3) the product or
parts covered; (4) a statement of what the warrantor will do in the
event of defect, etc.; (5) a statement of what the consumer must do;
(6) exceptions and exclusions from the warranty; (7) the required
procedure for the consumer; (8) information about any informal
dispute settlement procedure; (9) description of legal remedies; (10)
the period within which the warranty will operate; (11) the period
of time within which the warrantor will perform after being notified;
(12) characteristics of the products which are not covered by the
warranty; and (13) the elements of the warranty in words or phrases
which will not mislead a reasonable, average consumer. The warran-
tor under an express warranty is prohibited from disclaiming any
implied warranties but he may (by conspicuous print) limit the
duration of any implied warranty to the duration of an express
warranty.
The act may be "much ado about nothing" in many cases be-
cause it does not compel the giving of any written warranty; it
simply requires that a written warranty, if given, must contain con-
sumer safeguards. The result in many trades may well be the total
53. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-15, repealing FLA. STAT. ch. 541 (1973).
54. 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 2301-2310 (1975).
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elimination of any written warranty, and, again, the consumer may
be more hurt than helped by the "do-gooders."
III. BULK SALES
A. Recent Cases
In a short-lived case of first impression in Florida, it has been
held that the sale of the assets of a restaurant is not covered by
article 6 (the bulk sales provision of the UCC), and, therefore, the
creditors of the vendor have no claim against the vendee as they
would if the sale were included under that provision. 5 As indicated
hereafter, 6 the legislature overruled this case within a few months
after it was decided. In a similar vein, it also has been decided that
the ordinary beauty salon (which is primarily a service business as
compared to a business which deals in the sale of merchandise) is
not a business covered under article 6 of the UCC. The court noted,
however, that if the testimony should show that the primary func-
tion of a beauty salon was the sale of merchandise rather than a
service enterprise, it could come within section 6-102(3) and the
comment to section 6-102 of the UCC as a "bulk sales" business. 7
In the sale of a going business when the sales contract provides
that the purchase price is to be based upon a balance sheet as of a
certain date, it is improper for the seller to change his accounting
practices (without notice to the buyer) to show sales orders for fu-
ture delivery as accounts receivable without also showing a corre-
sponding reduction in inventory or some other indication that goods
would have to be purchased to meet these future deliveries. 8
B. Legislation
Under a 1975 amendment to the bulk sales section of the Flor-
ida UCC, restaurants which are licensed by the Division of Hotels
and Restaurants of the Department of Business Regulation are now
subject to all of the bulk sales requirements." This amendment
effectively supersedes the case of De La Rosa v. Tropical Sand-
wiches, Inc.6
55. De La Rosa v. Tropical Sandwiches, Inc., 298 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974), noted
in 29 U. MIAMI L. REv. 597 (1975).
56. See note 59 infra and accompanying text.
57. Yarbrough v. Rogers, 300 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
58. Baywood Furniture Mart. Inc. v. Kennedy, 295 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
59. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-216, amending FLA. STAT. § 676.102 (1973).
60. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
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IV. WAREHOUSING AND TRANSPORTATION OF GOODS
When a bailee redelivers packages to the bailor and receives a
receipt for the goods, the receipt does not estop the bailor from
alleging that one of the packages was broken into while in the pos-
session of the bailee and goods were removed with responsibility
being on the bailee. The receipt is evidence of the fact of receipt of
whatever is mentioned in the receipt, but it is not conclusive proof
that the goods were received. The parol evidence rule does not apply
to receipts so as to preclude the admission of oral evidence contrary
to the terms of the receipt."
In order to recover damages from a carrier and to recover insur-
ance proceeds from an insurance company under an all risks policy
for damage allegedly occurring during the carriage of goods, it is
necessary to show that the goods were in good condition before the
shipment and attachment of the risk and that the damage occurred
while the goods were in custody of the carrier."
When a shipper ships goods in sealed cartons and the bill of
lading states; "Received . . the property described below, in ap-
parent good condition except . . . (Contents and condition of con-
tents unknown)," 3 and the facts show that the goods were shipped
"shipper's load and count," 4 the burden is on the shipper to show
that the goods were in good order when delivered to the carrier if
the shipper is claiming that the carrier damaged the goods in
transit. This would seem particularly appropriate when the cartons
with the damaged contents were delivered by the carrier without
any apparent damage to the cartons; the only possible inference was
that the damage occurred prior to the delivery to the carrier.
The mere filing of a claim of loss against a common carrier is
not tantamount to a limitation on the amount which is eventually
recoverable; this is particularly true when the claim specified a
reduced amount designed to procure an immediate settlement.65
61. International Gem Stone v. Harper-Robinson & Co., 299 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1974).
62. Oran Ltd. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 301 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
63. United Steel & Strip Corp. v. Monex Corp., 310 So. 2d 339, 341 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
64. Id.
65. Thibadeau v. Santini Bros., 315 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
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V. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
A. Negotiability
A promissory note which provides that payment was to be made
"from Cigarette Commissions""6 creates an ambiguity as to whether
the creation of the fund was to be a condition precedent to liability
of an indorser of the instrument, and testimony would have to be
introduced on this issue.
A promissory note which provides that the "Buyer agrees to pay
to Seller""7 lacks the magic words "to order or to bearer" 8 and is not,
therefore, a negotiable instrument. Any assignee of the seller would
then be subject to all defenses existing between the buyer and the
seller.
When a promissory note mentions that it is secured by a mort-
gage, this reference does not destroy negotiability; however, when
the note recites that "[t]he terms of said mortgage are by this
reference made a part hereof,"" this renders the note non-negotiable
because it does not contain an unconditional promise to pay as
required by section 3-104(1)(b) of the UCC and it falls within sec-
tion 3-105(2)(a) which states that the promise is not unconditional
if the instrument states that it is governed by any other instrument.
As a result, when this note is endorsed and the mortgage assigned
to a third person by the payee, this third person cannot be a holder
in due course, but is a mere assignee subject to the defense of fraud
between the original parties.
B. Mistake
Cancellation by a court of equity of promissory notes is proper
when the facts show that all of the parties (makers and payees) were
completely mistaken and based their actions upon a misunder-
standing of the results of the arrangement reached."
C. Massachusetts Business Trust
A Massachusetts business trust is a separate legal entity for the
purpose of being sued under the laws of Massachusetts, and if it has
qualified to do business in Florida, it is improper to sue individual
66. Rothenberg v. Mellow Music, Inc., 291 So. 2d 234, 235 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
67. Locke v. Aetna Acceptance Corp., 309 So.2d 43, 44 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
68. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-104(1)(d).
69. Holly Hill Acres, Ltd. v. Charter Bank, 314 So. 2d 209, 210 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
70. Lake Killarney Apartments, Inc. v. Estate of Thompson, 283 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1973).
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trustees of the trust upon a promissory note issued by the trust
which on its face negatives their personal liability.7'
D. Payment
In the absence of a dispute between the drawer of a check and
the payee as to the amount owed to the payee, the payee's accept-
ance of and cashing of a check bearing the notation "paid in full to
the date of abeyance"7 does not constitute an acceptance of the
check's proceeds as full payment of the debt.
Section 4-405 of the UCC provides that the death of a customer
does not automatically terminate the bank's authority to pay a
check drawn by the customer prior to his death; the bank can pay
at any time if it does not have knowledge of the customer's death
and can pay for a period of ten days after death even if it has
knowledge, unless someone claiming an interest in the account stops
payment. This section was designed to protect banks, and it does
not protect a payee of a check who collects the check's proceeds after
the death of the drawer. The drawer's executor may, in a proper
case, recover the proceeds of the check under section 732.53 of the
Florida Statutes. 73
E. Usury
Remedies based upon usury statutes do not create vested
rights, but only penalties, and such penalties or forfeitures may be
repealed or modified. For example, in Goodfriend v. Druck74 a guar-
antor of a promissory note agreed to pay interest of 15 per cent per
annum if he should be called upon to pay. The maker defaulted and
suit was brought against the guarantor for interest at the rate of 15
per cent per annum. Subsequently, section 687.11(1) of the Florida
Statutes, which provides that an individual guarantor is not liable
for interest in excess of 10 per cent per annum, was enacted. The
court held that the guarantor was liable for only 10 per cent per
annum.
A statute which imposes certain sanctions for usury may be
repealed at any time, with the result that the borrower will be de-
prived of a remedy. Further, a new usury statute which is enacted
in place of the repealed statute will not have a retroactive effect. As
71. Boyd v. Boulevard Nat'l Bank, 306 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
72. Roll v. Spero, 293 So. 2d 370, 371 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
73. Black v. Hart, 301 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
74. 289 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1974).
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a result, a loan which was subject to the repealed statute will not
be covered by the new, and the loan will fall in the gap between the
termination date of the old and the effective date of the new statute,
leaving the borrower without a remedy.75
If a mortgage "finder" is the agent for the lender (rather than
the borrower), then the amount of the finder's fees is added to the
interest charged, and the total is then apportioned over the period
starting with the closing date of the transaction and ending either
with the date of the foreclosure judgment or the original maturity
date of the loan, whichever is prior in time, in order to determine
whether the total sums charged constitute usurious interest.76
The usurious nature of a loan is to be determined by the law of
the place where the contract is entered into. If the law of that place
provides that money advanced for the purpose of a joint venture is
not to be deemed usurious, or that a loan will not be deemed usu-
rious because of the possibility that more than the legal rate of
interest will be charged where there is an agreement to pay an
amount which may be more or less than the legal rate depending
upon a reasonable contingency, then the borrower (a resident of
Florida) will not be able successfully to plead usury."
A stockholder's agreement providing for a preferential distribu-
tion of corporate profits from a condominium development which
was to be financed by loans does not infect the transaction with
usury even though the close corporation is thinly capitalized and it
is characterized as a Subchapter S corporation under federal income
tax laws."5
A mortgage commitment fee is not a charge for the use of
money, but rather it is the price paid for the right to secure a loan
by a borrower, and, as a result, it cannot be considered as interest.
However, closing costs over and above the actual costs incurred by
a lender are to be treated as interest in order to determine the
question of usury.79
F. Dead Man's Statute
When one partner borrows money (evidenced by a series of
promissory notes) for the business, the other partner (who is not a
75. Padgett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 297 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
76. Feemster v. Schurkman, 291 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
77. Goodman v. Olsen, 305 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1975), rev'g 291 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
78. Little v. Caswell-Doyle-Jones Corp., 305 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
79. Financial Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Burleigh House, Inc., 305 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1975).
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party to the notes) is an interested witness because of potential legal
liability and is therefore incompetent to testify in a suit brought by
the widow of the lender against the maker of the note under the dead
man's statute, section 90.05 of the Florida Statutes. °
A somewhat unusual application of the dead man's statute was
made in Pickard v. Miggins.5 ' The executor of the estate of a payee
brought suit against the maker who claimed payment as a defense.
A third person testified that the maker gave his check to this third
person who cashed it and then paid the proceeds to the payee in
payment of the note. Both the trial court and the appellate court
agreed that this third person was not a disinterested witness and
was therefore incompetent to testify under the statute.
G. Legislation
Section 687.03 of the Florida Statutes was amended" to clarify
the legislature's intention that, for the purpose of determining the
question of usury,
the rate of interest on any loan of money shall be determined and
computed upon the assumption that the debt will be paid accord-
ing to the agreed terms, whether or not said loan is paid or col-
lected by court action prior to the term of said loan, and any
payments or property charged, reserved, or taken as an advance
or forbearance which are in the nature of and taken into account
in the calculation of, interest shall be valued as of the date re-
ceived and shall be spread over the stated term of the loan for the
purpose of determining the rate of interest.
The same section was amended to provide that a loan shall be
deemed to be in excess of $500,000 in amount if either the loan has
an initial balance in excess of $500,000 or the parties agreed that the
loan would exceed this figure during its life even though less than
this sum is actually advanced. The amended act further provides
that in the event that the loan does exceed $500,000, any stock
options and interest in profits, receipts or residual values which are
taken by the lender shall not be included in the calculation of inter-
est. Finally, as mentioned in a prior Survey, 3 individual guarantors
of loans in excess of $500,000 may be charged up to 15 percent
interest.
80. Wasserman v. Weiss, 313 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
81. 311 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
82. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-232, amending FLA. STAT. § 687.03, 687.11 (1973).
83. Murray, Negotiable Instruments and Banking, 28 U. MAMI L. REV. 63, 73 (1973).
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Under an amendment to section 95.031 of the Florida Statutes,
the cause of action on a written instrument which is payable on
demand or after date with no specific maturity date accrues against
the maker and endorsers, guarantors or other persons secondarily
liable upon the first written demand for payment "notwithstanding
that the endorser, guarantor or other person secondarily liable has
executed a separate writing evidencing such liability."84 Further,
the payment of any part of the principal or interest of any obligation
or liability founded upon a written instrument tolls the running of
the statute of limitations.
An interesting amendment has been made to the worthless
check statutes. In any prosecution under chapter 832, the making,
drawing, or delivery of a check, payment of which is refused by the
drawee because of a lack of funds, shall be prima facie evidence of
intent to defraud (or knowledge of insufficient funds) unless the
maker or drawer shall have paid the holder the amount due together
with a service charge not to exceed $5.00 or five percent of the face
amount of the check, whichever is greater, within 20 days after the
holder has made written demand (in accordance with a statutory
form) by certified or registered mail. 5
H. Impairment of Collateral
An indorser of a promissory note (which is secured by a mort-
gage) will be released from the note when the holder satisfies the
mortgage without the indorser's knowledge or consent.86
VI. MORTGAGES
A. Documentary Stamps
When a "wrap-around" note and mortgage are executed for
$3,500,000, and $1,858,000 of this sum represents the amount of a
note previously executed upon which state documentary stamps
have been paid, documentary stamps must now be paid on the total
sum of $3,500,000 because the second note does not merely renew
the first, but enlarges it. Section 201.09 of the Florida Statutes
provides that a renewal note which does not enlarge the original note
in any way is exempt from documentary stamp taxes; however, if
the second note enlarges the amount of the first, then the tax is due
on the entire face amount of the second note.
84. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-234, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 95.031, 95.051 (1973).
85. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-189, creating FLA. STAT. § 832.07 (1975).
86. National Bank v. Mercer, 292 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
87. State Dep't of Revenue v. McCoy Motel, Inc., 302 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
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B. Bona Fide Mortgagees
A prospective lender who is contemplating taking a realty mort-
gage from a trustee whose trust administration has been a matter
of record in the circuit court must make diligent inquiry into the
terms of the trust and the authority of the trustee to execute the
mortgage and may not rely upon the bona fide purchaser doctrine
in accepting the mortgage. If the mortgagee should fail to do so, a
court may invalidate the mortgage.8
The general rule that a mortgagee takes his rights subject to the
rights of purchasers in possession at the time of recordation of the
mortgage received an unusual application in First Federal Savings
& Loan Association of Martin County v. Ott. 9 A construction mort-
gage was used to finance construction of a condominium. The con-
dominium developer entered into a contract of sale with a purchaser
for one unit of the condominium, the contract providing that the
developer would have the construction mortgage lien on the unit
discharged at time of closing. The developer executed a permanent
mortgage to the construction mortgagee the day before selling the
unit to the purchaser. The purchaser had, however, lived in the unit
prior to the execution of this permanent mortgage, and the construc-
tion lender had actual knowledge of this fact. The court held that,
as a consequence, the purchaser had the right to have this mortgage
cancelled.
When an owner of real property induces a materialman to re-
frain from filing a notice of commencement under the mechanic's
lien law upon the fraudulent statement that the owner was arrang-
ing financing and would pay the materialman as soon as the financ-
ing was arranged, and as a result, the materialman is deprived of
any chance to perfect a mechanic's lien, an equity court may im-
press an equitable lien against the property. This equitable lien will,
however, be inferior to the mortgage lien of a mortgage company
which financed the owner, and the mere fact that the owner was a
stockholder in the mortgage company will not be enough to charge
the mortgage company with having participated in the fraud of the
owner so as to subordinate its lien to the equitable lien of the de-
frauded materialman. 9
The set-off of a husband's debt owed solely by the mortgagee-
husband to the mortgagor is insufficient to satisfy the mortgagor's
88. Hastings Potato Growers Ass'n v. Ponar, 296 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
89. 285 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
90. Hall's Misc. Iron Works, Inc. v. All S. Inv. Co., 283 So. 2d 372 (Fla. lst Dist. 1973).
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debt to the husband and wife who were mortgagees on property
purchased from them as an estate by the entirety, when the wife
does not agree to this set-off and has had no part in its creation."
In a case of first impression in Florida, it has been held that a
recorded option agreement to create a mortgage creates a valid in-
terest in, and an encumbrance upon, real property. This option
agreement (when supported by consideration and when recorded
prior to a subsequent mortgage) is superior in right and time to the
subsequent mortgage. 2
C. Assignments
When a number of mortgages are being serviced by a collecting
bank and the mortgagee assigns these mortgages to an assignee, it
is the duty of the assignee to inform the bank in very clear terms
about the details of the assignment. If the assignee's notice is un-
clear and vague, then the bank is not liable if it continues to act in
behalf of the original mortgagee rather than the assignee. 3
The pledge of a mortgage without a pledge or assignment of the
note does not vest any rights in the pledgee because the mortgage
in a mere incident of the note. In this particular case the pledge was
part of a complicated "wrap-around" mortgage, and it was obvious
that the draftsmen were so absorbed in the details of the mortgage
that they overlooked the note. 4
D. Future Advances
Section 697.04 of the Florida Statutes provides that mortgages
on real property may secure advances, whether obligatory or not,
provided that the mortgage expresses on its face that future ad-
vances may or must be made. The District Court of Appeal, Second
District, has held that this condition is satisfied when the mortgage
mentions that any construction agreement which may be executed
between the parties shall become part of the mortgage because the
clause would put a reasonably prudent person on notice to inquire
of the parties whether future advances had been or were going to be
made. As a result, the mortgagee had priority over mechanic's lien
claimants who had perfected their liens subsequent to the recorda-
91. Davis v. Fat Man's Bar-B-Que, Inc., 289 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
92. Feemster v. Schurkman, 291 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
93. First Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity America Financial Corp., 305 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1975).
94. Sobel v. Mutual Dev., Inc., 313 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
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tion of the mortgage but prior to the making of advances for the
construction of improvements. 5
E. Subordination
A mortgage subordination agreement entered into by a first
mortgagee with a prospective mortgagee which provides that the
prospective mortgagee is to have first priority may not be limited
by terms of the first mortgagee's mortgage which provided that
subordination would be made onlv in the event that the subseouent
mortgage would be for improvements to be constructed on the prop-
erty. The prospective mortgagee could not be affected by the terms
of the original mortgage to which it was not a party.
F. Acceleration
It is reversible error for a trial court to refuse the mortgagee the
right to accelerate the mortgage indebtedness upon a breach by the
mortgagor of a provision in the mortgage requiring the mortgagor to
pay the taxes before they became delinquent. The fact that the
failure to pay the taxes was the result of inadvertence or neglect and
that the mortgagors had tendered all sums necessary to reimburse
the mortgagee who had expended money in redeeming a certificate
for delinquent taxes would not be legally sufficient to prevent the
mortgagee from accelerating the mortgage. 7
In a case of first impression in Florida, the District Court of
Appeal, Second District, has held that when there is a note and
mortgage and the mortgage provides that the entire balance of the
note may be accelerated in the event that the mortgagor sells the
encumbered property, the acceleration clause in the mortgage "be-
came part of the terms of the note where . . . the two were executed
contemporaneously and the instruments referred to each other,'' 9
and the mortgagee could accelerate the balance of the note. The
court did not answer the question whether a mortgage with a similar
provision can be accelerated and foreclosed without proof that the
mortgagee has been prejudiced by the sale because the issue was not
raised.
It is no defense to an acceleration of a mortgage (by the mortga-
gee) that the owner of the property had purchased the property from
95. Industrial Supply Corp. v. Bricker, 306 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
96. Roberts v. Harkins, 292 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
97. Heimer v. Albion Realty & Mortgage Co., 300 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
98. Stockman v. Burke, 305 So. 2d 89, 90 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
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the mortgagor and had then leased it back to the mortgagor who had
defaulted in his lease payments, thereby preventing the owner from
using the lease payments to pay the mortgage.9"
G. Defenses
In the absence of unusual factors (such as fraud, for example),
a defendant in a mortgage foreclosure action may not allege parol
evidence that the parties intended to exclude certain lands from the
lien of the mortgage as a defense in an effort to change the express
terms of the mortgage.100
A failure of the lender-mortgagee to abide by the requirements
of the Federal Truth in Lending Act' does not result in the invali-
dation of the mortgage; the act has penalties, but they do not affect
the validity of the mortgage."2
When a note and mortgage were obtained from a customer by
a contractor-mortgagee as a result of fraud and improper workman-
ship and both instruments were later assigned to a holder not in due
course, the holder may recover only the reasonable value of the labor
and materials (not the face amount of the mortgage) with no allow-
ance for profit and overhead.'
H. Foreclosure
Section 45.031(1) of the Florida Statutes provides that a mort-
gagor may redeem his property at any time before sale; however, it
has been held that this statute does not repeal the common law right
to redeem at any time until the sale is confirmed. As a result, the
mortgagor may redeem until the issuance of a certificate of title as
provided for in section 45.031(3) of the Florida Statutues.04
It is within the proper discretion of the trial court to set aside
a mortgage foreclosure sale when the property is of a substantial
value, the bid price was $50.00, and the attorney for the owner-
mortgagor who was to represent the owner in bidding at the sale
failed to appear because of mistake or inadvertance.° 5
When the mortgagee's right to foreclose is subject to the per-
99. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Luxury Home Builders, Inc., 311 So. 2d 160 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1975).
100. Venusa Dev. Corp. v. Southeast Mortgage Co., 297 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
101. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (1970).
102. Grandway Credit Corp. v. Brown, 295 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
103. Darling v. Rose, 301 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
104. Walters v. Gallman, 286 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
105. Van Delinder v. Albion Realty & Mortgage, Inc., 287 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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formance of a condition precedent, the complaint should allege the
performance of the condition; however, when the record in the trial
court shows that the condition has been performed, a judgment of
foreclosure will be affirmed on the basis that the failure to allege the
error in the complaint was harmless error.'
A dismissal of a suit for the foreclosure of a mortgage on the
grounds of a want of prosecution is neither a dismissal on the merits
nor is it res judicata of the controversy, and it cannot be pleaded in
bar of a subsequent foreclosure suit. °7
When a vendee gives back a "wrap-around" purchase money
second mortgage which includes the amount of an existing first
money mortgage and the mortgagor defaults in making payments
on the wrap-around mortgage, it is permissible for the second mort-
gagee to foreclose for the entire amount, including the amount due
on the first mortgage, even though the first mortgagee is not a party
to the suit and did not desire prepayment.'
If the amount bid at a foreclosure sale is inadequate and this
is coupled with the additional fact that the sale was conducted three
hours later than the time specified in the notice of sale, a court
should set the sale aside and order that a new sale be conducted. 0
A purchaser of the equity of redemption from a landlord-
mortgagor who has taken subject to a first mortgage does not as-
sume responsibility for unsecured claims (such as rental deposits)
against the landlord and, as a result, the purchaser is entitled to any
surplus funds accruing from the foreclosure of second and third
mortgages on the property. The purchaser has bought the property
free and clear of all liens except the first mortgage."0
If the buyers of real property bring a suit for damages for the
fraudulent concealment by the sellers of certain facts concerning the
zoning of the property, it is reversible error for the trial court (at the
request of the plaintiff-buyers) to enter an injunction temporarily
restraining the purchase money mortgagee-sellers from bringing any
action on the note and mortgage because this would be an impair-
ment of their contractual rights."'
Under rule 11-44(a) of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, a
petition filed under chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act by a mortga-
106. Voght v. Galloway, 291 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 1974).
107. Gibbs v. Trudeau, 283 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
108. J.M. Realty Inv. Corp. v. Stern, 296 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
109. Ohio Realty Inv. Corp. v. Southern Bank, 300 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1974).
110. Sens v. Slavia, Inc., 304 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 1974).
111. Sepielli v. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp., 313 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
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gor operates as an automatic stay of any foreclosure proceeding, and
any sale conducted thereafter must be set aside."2
I. Lis Pendens
Under section 48.23 of the Florida Statutes it is an abuse of
discretion for a trial court judge to discharge a notice of lis pendens
when the plaintiff is suing as an alleged subrogee of a mortgagee,
even though the statute provides that "when the initial pleading
does not show that the action is founded on a duly recorded instru-
ment . .. the court may control and discharge the notice of lis
pendens . .1.1."3
J. Attorneys' Fees
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that in the absence of
a clear indication in the promissory note and mortgage that the
parties intended to include attorneys' fees on appeal, an allowance
for the appeal is improper. A statement in the note and mortgage
that "reasonable attorney's fees""' are to be paid by the mortgagor
in the event of default and foreclosure is not sufficient; the clause
would have to specify that the mortgagor was also to pay attorneys'
fees for any and all appeals whether taken by the mortgagor or the
mortgagee.
Attorneys' fees may not be awarded to the mortgagee's attor-
neys for legal services rendered in attempting to collect usurious
interest in a mortgage foreclosure action; fees must be limited to
services performed in foreclosing the mortgage for the legally en-
forceable amount of the debt."'
It is permissible to award attorneys' fees in a mortgage foreclo-
sure action based upon affidavits rather than testimony as to the
reasonable value."6
A trial court may refuse to award attorneys' fees even though
they are provided for in a mortgage note when the mortgagee fails
to make any request for attorneys' fees and fails to introduce any
evidence at the trial to support an award."'
112. Heritage Family Pub, Inc. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 315 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1975).
113. Mapia v. Equitable Dev. Corp., 302 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
114. Ohio Realty Inv. Corp. v. Southern Bank, 300 So. 2d 679, 682 (Fla. 1974), followed
in Goodfriend v. Druck, 309 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
115. Feemster v. Schurkman, 291 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
116. Young v. Charnack, 295 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
117. Milgen Dev., Inc. v. Goodman, 302 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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A mortgagee who brings a foreclosure action for the failure of
the mortgagor to make the mortgage payments is entitled to attor-
neys' fees (in accordance with a term of the mortgage) even though
the mortgagee had refused to release one lot from the lien of the
mortgage in accordance with the request of the mortgagor made
pursuant to a term in the mortgage. The mortgagee may be liable
for damages for his wrongful refusal to release the lot from the lien,
but he does not forfeit his right to attorneys' fees."'
When a receiver is appointed to manage the subject property
in a mortgage foreclosure action, he may employ an attorney to
render services to the receiver and be awarded a reasonable sum to
pay the attorney's fees even when he did not receive prior court
approval for employing the attorney. However, it would be better
practice for the receiver to obtain court approval before employing
the attorney."9
VII. SURETIES AND GUARANTORS
An interesting aspect of the law of guaranty was involved in
Ruwitch v. First National Bank of Miami.' The president, vice-
president, and secretary-treasurer of a corporation originally signed
personal guaranties of a $25,000 line of credit extended to the corpo-
ration which was managed by the secretary-treasurer. For several
years, this line of credit increased in stages to $140,000, each in-
crease accompanied by written guaranties purportedly signed by all
three officers. In fact the secretary-treasurer had forged the signa-
tures of the other two officers to secure the increased line of credit.
Subsequently, the forgeries were discovered and the two guarantors
were held liable to the lending bank on the grounds that they per-
mitted the fraud to be consummated and, as between themselves
and the bank, the loss ought to fall on them. The bank was, there-
fore, entitled to a judgment for $22,352.46, which was the difference
between the amount of the loss ($120,000) and the amount paid to
the bank by the surety company ($97,647.54) because of the forgery.
The court then held that the equities of the surety (which was a paid
surety) were not superior to the equities of the guarantors, and
therefore, the paid surety would not be able to recover its losses from
the guarantors.
118. Dixon v. Peace, 307 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
119. Creative Property Management, Inc. v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 314 So. 2d 807
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
120. 291 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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A security interest in inventory may be given by a corporation
as security for a preexisting debt represented by promissory notes
which had been indorsed by an officer for the benefit of the corpo-
rate borrower; if the lender should release inventory from the secu-
rity interest without the knowledge or consent of the indorser, he is
discharged under section 3-606 of the UCC on the grounds of an
unjustifiable impairment of collateral.12" '
VIII. BANKS AND SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS
A. Bank Collection Problems
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that it was a jury question
whether a collecting bank's miscoding was the proximate cause of
loss of the proceeds of a check, reversing the District Court of Ap-
peal, First District, which had reversed a jury verdict. 22
In Peoples Bank in North Fort Myers v. Bob Lincoln, Inc.,"'23 a
used car dealer purchased a new car from a new car dealer, the car
to be titled in the name of a third person. The new car dealer called
Peoples Bank and was told that the bank would honor the sight
draft given in payment by the used car dealer. The bank received
the draft on March 30 and dishonored it on April 9. The court held
that in failing to dishonor within the "midnight deadline"'2 4 (mid-
night of the banking day following the banking day of receipt), the
bank became accountable'25 to the new car dealer for the face
amount of the sight draft. The opinion is unfortunately cluttered
with irrelevant statements and citations which serve to confuse the
simple issue of accountability.
When a holder of a check deposits it in his bank for credit and
receives provisional credit under section 4-201(1) of the UCC, this
provisional credit may be revoked under section 4-211 and charged
back against his account under section 4-212(1) if the bank acts
within times provided in section 4-212. As a result, the depositor will
have no cause of action against his depository bank when the check
is dishonored by the drawee bank as long as compliance is made
with the requirements of these sections of the UCC.126
A bank which cashes a forged check may not be liable to the
121. Guida v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 308 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
122. Exchange Bank v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 292 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1974), rev'g 277 So. 2d
313 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
123. 283 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
124. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-104(1)(h).
125. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-302.
126. Heumann v. United Nat'l Bank, 287 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
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payee for the amount of the check except for any proceeds still
remaining in the bank's hands, provided that the bank shows that
it cashed the check in good faith and in accordance with reasonable
commercial standards applicable to such bank in accordance with
section 3-419(3) of the UCC.127
UCC section 3-419(3) received an unusual application in Keane
v. Pan American Bank."8 A member of a three-man law firm with-
drew from the partnership. Subsequently, a check made payable to
the withdrawing partner and one of the other two partners was
received by the remaining two partners, who instructed their book-
keeper to deposit it in the old account still carried in the name of
the three partners. The bookkeeper used a rubber stamp "For de-
posit only HARKAVY, MOXLEY & KEANE 035-602,'1" deposited
the check and eventually the proceeds were withdrawn by Harkavy
and Moxley and put in their new checking account. Keane sued the
depository bank and Moxley. The court held that there was expert
testimony that the handling of the check by the bank was in accord-
ance with reasonable commercial standards. Although the bank
knew that the firm had dissolved, it was proper to have the original
checking account kept open for the purpose of depositing fees for
services rendered before the dissolution of the firm. The bank was
not obligated to make inquiry into the correctness of processing this
check as similar checks had been handled in the past.
If a bank has actual knowledge that funds deposited in a cus-
tomer's account belong to a third person, it may not assert its
banker's lien against these funds for a claim which it has against
its customer. 3 '
B. Joint Bank Accounts
Section 665.271 of the Florida Statutes provides that when a
savings account is maintained in a savings and loan association in
the name of two or more persons in such form that the money in the
account is payable to either or the survivor or survivors, then such
account shall be the property of these persons as joint tenants, and
the account shall be payable to the surviving tenant or tenants. In
a recent case this statute was held to govern an account which was
opened prior to the effective date of the statute because the statute
127. Robert A. Sullivan Constr. Co. v. Wilton Manors Nat'l Bank, 290 So. 2d 561 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1974).
128. 309 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
129. Id. at 580.
130. 4715 Realty Corp. v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 301 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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uses the word "maintained," and if the account is "maintained"
while the statute is in force, it governs the account. The court also
held that this statute would grant rights of survivorship to joint
tenants even when there was no evidence that the parties entered
into any kind of a survivorship contract between themselves and the
savings and loan association. Further, the court held that when the
same parties opened a checking account as joint tenants with rights
of survivorship and the evidence showed that one tenant furnished
all the funds and had a donative intent to give the other tenant
rights in the account, there was a presumption of a gift which had
not been rebutted and the surviving tenant would take the entire
account even without the aid of any statute.'3'
In a case of first impression in Florida, it has been held that
when a savings account is in the name of two people, "payable to
either or the survivor,"' 32 and both people become mentally incom-
petent, there remaining no evidence available as to the actual own-
ership interests in the account, a guardian does not have the power,
nor may a court authorize the guardian, to terminate the joint ac-
count and to divide the moneys equally. The right to terminate the
account is one personal to the ward and not to the guardian. Each
owner will continue to have the right of survivorship should the
other die, and either guardian has the right to withdraw funds from
the account for necessities only of his incompetent ward.
C. Garnishment
The United States Supreme Court has invalidated the Georgia
garnishment statutes on the grounds that they violated the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The statutes permit-
ted the garnishment of bank accounts without any provision for an
early hearing at which the creditor must show probable cause for the
garnishment. It should be noted that the case involved the garnish-
ment of a business' checking account, not the bank account of a
consumer.' 3 It would appear that the Florida garnishment stat-
utes,'34 which provide that the courts "shall always be open for
hearing motions to dissolve the garnishment," are not subject to the
same vulnerability as Georgia's.
When a bank account has been garnished, the bank is obligated
to obey the writ and to retain funds of its customer; the court has
131. Teasley v. Blankenberg, 289 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
132. In re Guardianship of Williams, 313 So. 2d 411, 412 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
133. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 716 (1975).
134. FLA. STAT. § 77.07 (1973).
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no power to authorize the bank to proceed to pay certain checks
from the customer's account. '5
Section 61.12 of the Florida Statutes provides that attachment
or garnishment may be made against the property of a head of a
family in Florida to enforce orders for alimony, suit money or sup-
port, or other orders in actions for divorce or alimony. However, if
the order for attorneys' fees has been reduced to a judgment and
execution is authorized, attachment or garnishment may not be
levied against the bank account of the head of a family. 3 '
Florida's garnishment statutes (chapter 77) are silent as to the
right of a garnishee to amend its answer, and the District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, has held that in view of Florida's liberal
policy of allowing amendments to pleadings in general, the trial
court should, in the proper exercise of its discretion, allow a gar-
nishee to amend its answer when justice so requires.'37
In a case of first impression in Florida, it has been held that a
codefendant who is jointly liable for a judgment cannot be named
as a garnishee under the Florida garnishment statutes.'38
The Supreme Court of Florida has decided 3 ' that the provision
of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968'1o which lim-
its the maximum amount of wages of a non-head of a family which
may be subjected to garnishment to 25 percent of his disposable
earnings for the week or the amount by which his disposable
earnings for the week exceeded thirty times the federal minimum
hourly wage preempts sections 77.01 and 77.06 of the Florida Stat-
utes, which do not prescribe any ceiling on the amount of wages
which may be garnished. The remaining Florida garnishment provi-
sions are not in conflict with the Consumer Credit Act and are valid.
It has been held that a bank which not only fails to notify a
customer for over a month that a writ of garnishment of the cus-
tomer's accounts has been served on the bank, but places a "hold"
on only two of the four accounts held by the customer, must, be-
cause of its negligence, bear resulting losses. These losses occurred
when the customer drew checks which were dishonored by the bank
and the bank was forced to pay money to the garnishor. When the
135. Kipnis v. Taub, 286 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
136. Costa v. Costa, 285 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
137. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Crabtree Constr. CO., 283 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1973).
138. Scogin v. Scogin's Inc., 287 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974), interpreting FLA. STAT.
ch. 77 (1973).
139. Phillips v. General Fin. Corp., 297 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1974).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1970).
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customer's credit, etc. has suffered, and it is impossible to put the
parties back to status quo, the bank may not recover the amount
paid from the customer. 4'
If a garnishee does not owe any money to a judgment debtor,
then the garnishment ought to be dissolved. For example, when a
lessee corporation assigns its leasehold interest to an officer of the
corporation and the lessee, the assignee officer and the original les-
sor subsequently agree that the assignee is to pay rent directly to
the lessor, this constitutes a novation, and since the assignee officer
pays rent directly to the lessor, she does not owe funds to the lessee
corporation. A judgment creditor of the lessee corporation, there-
fore, has no rights of garnishment against the assignee officer.'42
Although an order dissolving a writ of garnishment is a final
order subject to an appeal, an order denying a motion to dissolve a
writ of garnishment is an interlocutory order. A motion to rehear the
order denying the motion to dissolve does not, therefore, toll the
running of the time within which to file an interlocutory appeal.'
D. Purchases of Bank Stock
Section 659.14 of the Florida Statutes provides that whenever
a person (or group of persons, or a corporation) proposes to purchase
"the majority of the outstanding capital stock of any state bank or
trust company," such person must first make application to the
commissioner for a certificate of approval. In a case of first impres-
sion, this statute has been construed to mean that a person may
acquire any amount of stock less than a majority without the ap-
proval of the commission even though he may have the intent to
purchase eventually more than a majority of the stock."
E. Legislation
Section 77.06(2) of the Florida Statutes has been amended to
require the garnishee bank or financial institution to report in its
answer the name and address of the defendant if known to the
garnishee. Then the plaintiff (within five days after receipt of the
garnishee's answer) is to serve upon the defendant a copy of the
garnishee's answer and a copy of the writ of garnishment."5
141. Central Plaza Bank & Trust Co. v. Parker, 300 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
142. Reeves v. Don L. Tullis & Associates, 305 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
143. Hamilton v. Hanks, 309 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
144. Interbay Citizens Bank v. Weaner, 311 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
145. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-98.
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Under section 678.102(3) of the Florida Statutes (UCC section
8-102(3)) a "clearing corporation" is a corporation "all of the capital
stock of which is held by or for a national securities exchange or
association registered under a statute of the United States such as
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." Under a 1974 amendment to
the Florida Statutes, Florida banks and trust companies may now
invest in the stock of clearing corporations up to 10 percent of the
unimpaired capital and surplus of the bank or trust company. 146
Further, fiduciaries who hold securities may deposit these securities
in a clearing corporation.'47
State banks may now lend up to $10,000 instead of the former
maximum of $5,000 for home improvement loans secured by second
mortgages.'
Applications, examination reports and investigation reports of
banks and trust companies 4 ' and savings and loan associations 50
may now be disclosed in response to a legislative subpoena, and
these records while in the possession of any legislative body or com-
mittee must be kept confidential and may not be disclosed to the
public except in cases involving investigation of charges against any
officer subject to impeachment.
The savings and loan associations statutes which deal with real
estate loans were amended: to provide that the associations may
now participate in real estate loans with approved F.H.A. mort-
gages; to empower associations to make loans on real estate located
outside the primary lending area up to 20 (from the former 10)
percent of the assets of the association; to require associations to
increase their reserves to at least five percent of all savings accounts
within a period not in excess of 20 years; and to provide that state
chartered associations should have the same loan and investment
powers and authority as federally chartered associations. 5'
It is now permissible to create an inter vivos trust in credit
union accounts in addition to those previously permitted in banks
and savings and loan associations.'52
After many years of resistance by the legislature, branch bank-
ing has come to Florida. Any bank may now establish up to two
146. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-223, amending FLA. STAT. § 659.20 (1973).
147. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-224, creating FLA. STAT. §§ 518.115, 518.116 (1974).
148. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-164, amending FLA. STAT. § 659.17(3)(d)(4)(1973).
149. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-84, amending FLA. STAT. § 658.10(1) (1973).
150. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-83, amending FLA. STAT. § 665.111(1) (1973).
151. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-55, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 665.381(2)(b)(1), 665.381(2)(c),
665.201, 665.215 (1973).
152. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-78, amending FLA. STAT. § 689.075(2) (1973).
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branches per year within the limits of the county in which the par-
ent bank is located, and any bank may also establish branches by
merger with other banks located within the county in which the
parent is located. As a condition precedent to the establishing of a
branch, the parent bank must secure the approval of the Depart-
ment of Banking upon such conditions as the department may pre-
scribe, including a satisfactory showing by the bank that the public
convenience and necessity will be served by the establishing of the
branch. 5 '
Section 659.062 of the Florida Statutes has been created' 4 to
provide for the electronic transfer of money between banks, savings
and loan associations and credit unions. The section seems to state
that banks and savings and loan associations are liable to their
customers for unauthorized withdrawals caused by the failure of the
institutions to maintain "reasonable procedures" to prevent such
withdrawals. The inference is that if the withdrawals are accom-
plished in spite of these "reasonable procedures," the loss falls on
the customer. It would seem that Price v. Neal'55 may be dead in
the electronic age.
UCC section 4-104(1)(g) (section 674.104(1)(g) of the Florida
Statutes) has been amended to provide that an "item" includes an
instrument or electronically recorded, stored or transmitted mes-
sage for the payment of money. 5 '
Under a 1975 amendment to the Florida banking laws, the De-
partment of Banking and Finance must examine the financial con-
dition of each state bank at least twice every 18 months and each
state bank and trust company is now required to perform an annual
internal audit. 157
IX. SECURITY INTERESTS
A. Venue
When goods are sold to a foreign corporation for delivery in
Seminole County to third parties who are residents of Orange
County and the vendor has a security interest in these goods, it may
sue the vendee in Polk County, where the cause of action for breach
153. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-217, amending FLA. STAT. § 659.06(1)(a) (1973).
154. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-134.
155. 3 Burr. 1354 (1762); see UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-417, 3-418 for the codified
version of Price v. Neal.
156. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-73.
157. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-162, amending FLA. STAT. § 658.07(1)(a), (2)(a).
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of the sales contract accrued. In addition, the vendor may seek
foreclosure of the security interest in Polk County over the protest
of the third party that the proper venue lies in Seminole County,
where the goods are located. 5 Section 47.041 of the Florida Statutes
specifically provides for laying venue in one county when causes of
action which arose in different counties are joined.
B. Perfection and Priorities of Security Interests
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that under section 9-
302(1)(c) of the Code, a seller of farm equipment need not file a
financing statement to perfect a security interest in farm equipment
which is sold under one contract when each of several separate items
costs less than $2,500, even though the total purchase price of the
items exceeds $2,500. The court further held that under sections 9-
312(4) and (5) of the Code, a party with a perfected security interest
in after-acquired property does not take priority over another party
with a purchase money security interest which was not perfected
within 10 days after the debtor took possession of the farm
equipment-collateral.'59 The court's holding regarding the question
of whether to separate or to lump together the various pieces of
equipment in order to determine the $2,500 valuation is questiona-
ble, but since the question may become moot if Florida adopts the
1972 version of section 9-302, no further discussion will be offered.
However, the court's second 4-3 holding that a perfected security
interest in after-acquired property does not take priority over an-
other party with a purchase money security interest which was not
perfected within 10 days after the debtor took possession of the
collateral is absolute nonsense. As Professor Henson simply resolves
the problem: 0
If a seller or a third party advancing the funds for the purchase
of goods fails to file within ten days after the debtor receives the
goods, the purchase money priority is lost and priority will be
determined according to the rules of Section 9-312(5). This will
usually mean that priority is determined in the order of filing, so
that an earlier filed financier of equipment claiming after-
acquired goods would have priority over a later purchase money
financier who did not file within ten days.
158. Motsinger v. E.B. Malone Corp., 297 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
159. International Harvester Credit Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank, 296 So. 2d 32 (Fla.
1974), noted in 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 384 (1975).
160. R. HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERICIAL CODE 78
(1973).
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It must be noted that Justice Carlton in dissenting clearly portrayed
the egregious error of the majority in using "unspecified contractual
constitutional requirements" and "equitable principles"'' to mis-
construe sections 9-312(4) and (5) of the UCC.
In Dyer v. First National Bank at Orlando,"' a court in a 1964
chapter X bankruptcy proceeding provided for repayment of a debt
to unsecured creditors by means of a sinking fund which was to be
secured by a security interest in the debtor's state racing permit. In
a 1971 reorganization proceeding it was discovered that section 9-
401 of the Florida UCC had not been complied with in that the
financing statement did not list the racing permit as covered prop-
erty. The trustee in the 1971 proceedings maintained that the secu-
rity interest was, therefore, invalid. It was held, however, that the
court had the power to uphold the validity of the 1964 plan, not as
an attempt to modify the plan (which would be improper), but to
effectuate it in accordance with the original plan.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida has decided that a financing statement which describes the
collateral as "various equipment, see Schedule 'A' attached
hereto"'' 3 is a sufficient description (against the trustee in bank-
ruptcy of the debtor), even though the referred to schedule was not
attached to the financing statement, in light of the intent of the
UCC that the function of a financing statement is to put future
creditors, security interest holders, etc. on notice.
As if the Supreme Court of Florida had not done enough dam-
age to the UCC in? the International Harvester"4 case, the court
continued to demonstrate a woeful ignorance of the UCC and an
apparent inability to do adequate research in Florida law in its
handling of Greyhound Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Austin.6 ' In Greyhound,
used rental cars owned by Greyhound were placed by it on the used
car lot of Family Cars with either actual authority to sell (as stated
by the majority of the court) or apparent authority to sell (as stated
by dissenting Justice McCain) to the public. Between 300 and 1,000
cars were sold by this method, wherein Greyhound would hold the
title certificate until it received payment from Family, and it would
then transfer the title certificate to the purchaser. Austin purchased
a car in this fashion; Family failed to pay Greyhound, which replev-
161. 296 So. 2d at 40.
162. 502 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1974).
163. In re Stegman, 15 UCC REP. SERV. 225, 226 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
164. See note 159 supra and accompanying text.
165. 298 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 1974).
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ined the car from Austin. Austin claimed title, and the trial court
and District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that title was
acquired by Austin. The majority of the Supreme Court held that
sections 319.21 and 319.22 of the Florida Statutes, which provide
that a purchaser does not acquire a "marketable title" without issu-
ance of a certificate of title, do not prevent a valid legal title from
being acquired by a bona fide purchaser when the true owner au-
thorizes a dealer to sell the car to the public. The 1957 case of Motor
Credit Corp. v. Woolverton66 was cited as authority for holding that
the purchaser prevails over the record title holder, Greyhound. The
majority made no mention of sections 2-403 and 9-307(1) of the UCC
which directly cover this issue.
Justice McCain in dissent did mention section 2-403. He stated,
however, that section 2-102, which provides that the UCC does not
impair or repeal any statute regulating sales to consumers, farmers
or other specified classes of buyers, leaves unimpaired chapter 319
of the Florida Statutes, and that section 2-403(2) is in direct conflict
with sections 319.21 and 319.22 of the Florida Statutes, concluding
that section 2-403, therefore, has no applicability to this case. Both
the majority and the dissent failed to cite Stroman v. Orlando Bank
and Trust Co.,' 7 Correria v. Orlando Bank & Trust Co.'68 and
Harmony Homes, Inc. v. Zeit,69 all of which held quite correctly
that section 2-403(2) is not inconsistent with sections 319.21 and
319.22 of the Florida Statutes, and that if the owner of a motor
vehicle entrusts it with a dealer who deals inothe sale of motor
vehicles, he has the power to pass on valid title (although not mar-
ketable title) to a buyer in ordinary course of business even though
a title certificate is retained by the original owner and never deliv-
ered to the buyer in ordinary course. The majority decision in
Greyhound comes to the right result, but the authority cited is out
of date, while the dissenting decision cites the right sections of the
UCC and then proceeds to misconstrue them.
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in citing a prior
Survey' 7 by the author, has held that former section 697.04 of the
Florida Statutes, which required that the "maximum principal
amount" of future advances be specified in security agreements in
order to make the future advances valid, was inconsistent with sec-
tion 9-204 of the UCC (the future advance provision), which does
166. 99 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 1957).
167. 239 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
168. 235 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
169. 260 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
170. Murray, Negotiable Instruments and Banking, 26 U. MIAMI L. REV. 72, 88 (1971).
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not have such a provision, and was superseded by the adoption of
the UCC in accordance with section 680.104(3) of the Florida Stat-
utes. 7'
A lease which provides that it may not be assigned without the
consent of the lessor is a "contract right" under section 9-106 of the
UCC, and the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has held
that this contract right may be encumbered by a security agreement
which provides that it covers "all of its [the lessee's] contract
rights."'72 The court made no determination as to the rights of the
lessor vis-a-vis the holder of the security interest.
A security agreement encumbering accounts which describes
the accounts as consisting of:'
(i) all accounts owned by Borrower at the date of this agreement;
(ii) all accounts at any time hereafter acquired by Borrower; (iii)
all Borrower's existing contract rights and all of Borrower's con-
tract rights which come into existence at any time hereafter; and
(iv) all proceeds of all such accounts and contract rights...
amply identifies the collateral; sums collected by the executrix of
the account borrower which were for work done by the borrower
prior to his death were proceeds of these accounts and the lender has
a security interest in these proceeds under section 9-306(1) of the
UCC.
C. Fixtures
It is erroneous for a court in a mortgage foreclosure action to
enjoin a plaintiff in a replevin action from removing "free-standing"
appliances"' from the mortgaged premises when the replevin plain-
tiff claims a properly perfected security interest in these appliances.
The question of priority ought to be determined in the replevin
action. If the mortgagee of the land and building wishes to prevent
the repossession of the appliances pending the outcome of the re-
plevin suit, he should post a bond under section 78.067 of the Florida
Statutes.
The District Court of Appeal, First District, was able to avoid
applying the fixture section (9-313) of the UCC by upholding a trial
court's decision that a hot water heater, sink, plumbing attach-
ments, countertop and backsplash, dishwasher, disposal unit,
171. Mason v. Avdoyan, 299 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
172. Gould, Inc. v. Hydro-Ski Int'l Corp., 287 So. 2d 115, 116 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
173. Barnett Bank v. Fletcher, 290 So. 2d 533, 534 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
174. General Elec. Co. v. O'Keefe. 309 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
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lights, cabinets, range hood and drop-in range installed by Sears,
Roebuck and Company pursuant to a conditional sales contract
with home mortgagors did not constitute fixtures. Therefore, Sears,
Roebuck was legally justified in its removal of the above items over
the protest of a first mortgagee which claimed all after-acquired
improvements or fixtures installed in the home subsequent to the
execution of the mortgage. The conditional sales contract recited
that the goods were not to become fixtures, and the court held that
this agreement between the conditional vendor and the mortgagors
could not bind the mortgagee; however:'"
the lower court in its final judgment holding the items to be
personalty states that there was no evidence of intent to "make
the annexation a permanent accession to the freehold". Since the
intention of the party making the annexation has been held to be
a primary test in determining whether an article is a fixture, a
finding of no evidence of intent requires a ruling that the articles
were in fact not fixtures.
D. Mechanics' Liens Versus Security Interests
A mechanic who has a valid mechanic's possessory lien on an
aircraft pursuant to section 713.58 of the Florida Statutes for repairs
made on the aircraft as a result of work done for the owner has
priority under section 9-310 of the UCC over a prior security interest
in the aircraft which has been recorded under federal law. Security
interests in aircraft must be perfected under federal law, but com-
pliance does not accord priority because the relative priorities of
mechanics' liens vis-a-vis security interests are matters of state
law. 176
E. Repossessions and Collections
A creditor who mistakenly credits a debtor's check to the wrong
account and then tells the debtor that if he does not make the
"overdue" payment his car will be repossessed may be held liable
for damages resulting from the debtor's being forced to sell his car
at a substantial loss, for loss of use of the car, loss of his job as a
result of a lack of transportation, and mental anguish, nervousness,
humiliation and inconvenience. In this particular case, the balance
of the loan was less than $3,000 and the jury awarded the debtor
175. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Stovall, 289 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
176. Carolina Aircraft Corp. v. Commerce Trust Co., 289 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
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$10,500; in some cases the value of extra-judicial repossession may
be overrated."'
When a vendor on credit seeks to replevin the goods before the
payment is due from the vendee and the court rules, therefore, in
favor of the vendee, the vendee is not entitled to recover the value
of the unpaid goods, but only the amount of any special interest that
the vendee may have in the goods in accordance with sections 78.21
and 78.19 of the Florida Statutes. 178
Although it is not entirely clear, it would appear that the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Third District, has held that when a security
agreement authorizes the secured party to enter the debtor's prop-
erty in order to repossess property upon default in payment, the
secured party is free from liability in doing so if the repossession is
done without breach of the peace. The court made no mention of
section 9-503 of the UCC. 17
Under former section 78.19 of the Florida Statutes, when a
conditional vendor (the holder of a security interest) has received
one or more payments from the vendee and has brought a replevin
action aginst the vendee because of a default in payments, the ven-
dor is entitled to a judgment for the balance of the unpaid purchase
price, not the original purchase price; the judgment may be satisfied
by recovery of the balance owing or by the recovery of the goods.'I"
Florida Statutes sections 679.503 and 679.504, which provide
for a secured creditor's rights peacefully to repossess secured collat-
eral upon default of a debtor and then sell it, have been again
upheld as valid under the Constitution of the United States.",
Section 559.72 of the Florida Statutes prohibits, in collecting
consumer claims, the use of any communication which simulates
legal or judicial process in any manner or which gives the appear-
ance of being authorized or approved by a government or an attor-
ney at law. A violation of the statute will subject the wrongdoer to
civil liability for actual damages or $500, whichever is greater, to-
gether with attorney's fees, court costs and punitive damages, if
appropriate. In a case of first impression, the District Court of Ap-
177. Hialeah-Miami Springs First State Bank v. Hogeland, 303 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1974).
178. Modine Mfg. Co. v. Israel, 294 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
179. Westchester Nat'l Bank v. Corey, 293 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 3d Dist.), appeal dismissed,
303 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1974).
180. American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Piedmont Sewing Supply, Inc., 287 So. 2d 111 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1973), cert. denied, 295 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 1974).
181. Shirey v. Government Employee's Corp., 287 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974),
following Northside Motors, Inc. v. Brinkley, 282 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1973).
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peal, First District, held that a communication which brackets the
names of the "creditor" and "debtor" in a style similar to a sum-
mons and contains some language identical to that used in legal
process might prima facie indicate a violation of the statute when
the facts are so pleaded in a complaint.'
X. CREDIT CARDS
The State of Florida under a parens patriae theory may not
bring a class action in behalf of Florida credit card holders against
the issuer of the cards to recover alleged usurious interest charged
because the general welfare and health of the state is not involved., 3
In prior suits the same court had held that a class action by one
credit card holder in behalf of the class would not lie. 4 Inasmuch
as the amounts involved would not normally justify an individual's
suing the corporate credit card issuer, it seems plain that a company
can charge usurious rates until it is threatened with a suit and then
can render it moot by agreeing to reform. 5
182. Tester v. National Credit Exch., Inc., 299 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
183. Shell Oil Co. v. State, 295 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
184. Syna v. Shell Oil Co., 241 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970); Federated Dep't Stores,
Inc. v. Pasco, 275 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
185. See Shell Oil Co. v. State, 295 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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